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UNITED STATES vs. MAYOR, &c., OF BURLINGTON.

Circuit Court of the United Statesfor the IDistrwt of Iowa.
January Term 1863.
THE UNITED STATES ex rel. LEARNED VS. THE MAYOR AND COUNCIL
OF THE CITY OF BURLINGTON.
The Federal Courts have jurisdiction and power to issue the writ of mandamus to %
municipal corporation to compel it to perform its duty, although such duty is
created and enjoined by state law alone.
An agreement to levy a special tax cannot be implied from an ordinance making it
the duty of the City Council "to provide means to meet the payment" of a designated debt when the same may become due.
A City Council has no power to levy taxes not expressly dtuthorized by its charter
or the law. Hence, where by the charter of a city it is provided that no greater
tax than one per centum shall be levied for any one year, and this maximum
rate is actually levied, a mandamus will be refused even to a judgment-creditor
to compel the city to levy a greater tax, or even to levy a speczftc tax to pay his
judgment.
MILLER, J.-The plaintiff having recovered against the City of
Burlington a judgment in the District Court of the United States
"for the State of Iowa, and having issued execution which was
returned nulla bona, applied to that Court for a writ of mandamus,
requiring the Mayor and Aldermen of said city to levy a special
tax for the payment of *said judgment. The cause being of that
class which, by the act creating this Court, is transferred into it,
the application is now made here for the peremptory writ.
The defendants, who have been served with notice, make answer
under oath to the information, and set up, substantially, the following reasons why the writ should not be granted:

1st. That the Courts of the Federal Governient have no jurisdiction to issue a writ of mandamus to persons whose functions
are created by state law, such officers being responsible alone to
state authority, so far as this writ is concerned.

2d. That there is nothing in the ordinance or contract, by which
the debt was created, which requires that any specific tax shall
be levied for the payment of this debt.

3d. That by the charter of the city of Burlington, no greater
tax than one per cent. per annum can be levied on the taxable

property of the city, and that the authorities have levied a tax of
that amount for the present year.
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The plaintiff objects, by way of demurrer, to the sufficiency of
the matters thus set up in the answer, which may be treated as
standing in the place of a return to an alternative writ.
1. If there were any doubt as to the power of the Federal
Courts to use the writ of mandamus in cases of this character, the
question is settled in favor of the existence of that power by the
case of The Commissioners of Knox County vs. Aspinwall, 24
Howard S. C. R. 376. The first objection is therefore untenable.
2. In reply to the second objection it is claimed by plaintiff that
in the ordinance for borrowing the money, under which the debt
was contracted, on which the judgment was rendered, there is a
provision for levying a specific tax for the payment of the debt and
interest.
The language of the ordinance on this subject is as follows:-Be it further enacted, that it shall be the duty of the City
Council of said city to provide means to meet the payment of said
bonds and coupons, when the same may become due, according to
the contract entered into for said loan and to pay the same.'
Does this language imply an agreement to levy a special tax
separate from other taxes or other resources of the city, for the
payment of this debt? Or does it imply that out of the various
resources of the city, its general annual tax, its wharfage, its
licenses, or its power to borrow money, some means will be provided
by the city authorities for that purpose ? The latter seems to be
the more reasonable construction of the ordinance.
The plaintiff, however, urges that by sections 1895, 1896, 1897
of the Code, Revision of 1860, § 3274 et seq., it is made the duty
of the Mayor and Aldermen of the city to levy a tax for the special
purpose of paying this debt, and to see that it is collected and appropriated to that purpose, and that this duty shouldc be enforced
by mandamus. These sections do provide that in cases where judgment has been recovered against a city or any other civil corporation,
and no property is found on which to levy execution, that " a tax
must be levied as early as practicable, sufficient to pay off the
judgment with interest and costs."'
1 These sections of the statute law are as follows:

Section 3274 (1895).

"Public buildings owned by the state, or any county,
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The case of The State at the relation of Brackett vs. The County
Judge of Floyd County, 5 Iowa R. 380, seems to intimate pretty
strongly that in such a case if the tax was not levied, a sufficient
remedy is provided by section 1897 in the personal responsibility
of the officers who should refuse to make the levy. From the view
taken of the present case by the Court, it is not necessary to decide
this point.
3. If it is true, as claimed by defendant, that the Mayor and
Aldermen of Burlington have no legal authority to levy any tax
on property liable to taxation, exceeding one per cent. per annum,
and that they have levied a tax of that amount for the present
year, it is clear that this Court cannot compel them to levy any
additional tax.
The only statutory provisions on that point, brought to the
attention of the Court, or which it has been able to find, are the
1st section of the Act of February 22d, 1847, to amend the charter
of the city of Burlington, and the 1st section of the Act of January
22d, 1853, to amend said charter.
By the act first mentioned, it is declared "that the amount of
tax to be levied upon real and personal estate by the Mayor and
Aldermen of the city of Burlington, after the taking effect of this
act, shall not exceed 121 cents on every one hundred dollars'
worth of property to be assessed." This is one-eighth of one per
cent.
The Act of 1853 says, ,That to defray the current expenses of
city, school district, or other civil corporation, or any other public property necessary and proper for carrying out the general, purpose of ie corporation, are exempt from execution. The property of a private citizen can in no case be levied
upon to pay the debt of a civil corporation."
Section 3275 (1896). "In case no property is found on which to levy, which is
not exempted by the last section, or if the judgment-creditor elect not to issue
execution against such corporation, he is entitled to the amount of his judgment
and costs in the ordinary evidences of indebtedness issued by that corporation.
And if the debtor corporation issues no scrip or evidence of debt, a tax must be levied as
early as possible."

Section 3276 (1897). "A failure on the part of officers of the corporation to
comply with the requirement of the last section, renders them personally liable for
the debt."
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said city, the City Council shall have power to levy and collect
taxes on all the real and personal property in said city, not exempted by general law from taxation: Provided, That the amount
of taxes levied for said purpose shall not in any one year exceed
one dollar on each one hundred dollars' worth of prbperty taxed."
The result of these two sections considered alone would seem to
e that except for the purpose of defraying the current expenses
)f the city, the tax cannot exceed one-eighth of one per cent.,
and cannot, for any or all purposes, exceed one per cent.
Do the provisions of §§ 1895, 1896, and 1897 of the Code repeal
the above sections of the city charter, or do they override them
when brought into question together, or is there any necessary
conflict between them ? There is certainly no express repeal, and
the Code could not be intended by implication to repeal the section last quoted, for it was passed since the Code became the law
of the land. The rule also is well understood, that a repeal by
implication can only arise when that is the necessary inference
from the impossibility that both the acts, supposed to be in conflict, can stand. If either act is to override the other, or repeal
the other, certainly the later expression of the legislative will must
stand in preference to the former. But in the present case, there
is no such necessary conflict. The provision of the Code can have
its effect by compelling the City Council to levy the tax so far as
it has power to levyr it. The provisions of the charter can stand as
they were intended, as a useful and just limitation of that power.
The previous year to this the City Council of Burlington, as
appears by the answer in this case, only levied a tax of one-half
per cent.
Undoubtedly if this was found to be inadequate to meet the
current expenses, and to provide a fund to meet the judgment, it
was the duty of the council under § 1897 of the Code, to so
increase the tax, inside of one per cent., as to raise that fundi if it
could be so done.
This they aver they have now done to the full extent of their
authority, and this Court will not order them to exceed it.
That this is a sound view of the intention of the framers of the
Code is strongly to be inferred, from some of its provisions on the
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subject of town and city corporations. Chapter 42 is devoted
to providing the manner in -which the citizens of a village
or town may organize themselves into a corporation, and. may
either assume the privileges and responsibilities of towns or cities
according to the number of the population. In speaking of a town
charter thus adopted, it says, § 665, that it may give. powers to
establish by-laws, ordinances, &c., and "to levy and collect taxes
on all property within the limits of such corporation which by the
laws of the State is not for all purposes exempt from. taxation,
which tax must not exceed one per cent. per annum on the assessed
value thereof," and § 669 says that "the preceding provisions are
applicable to a town desiring to become organized as a city." iow
these are the very corporations mentioned in §§1895 to 1897 inclusive, of which it is said that a tax must be levied to pay a judgment
recovered against them. Was it meant that they should absolutely,
at once, levy a tax sufficient to pay the debt without regard to the
one per cent. limitation in the previous sections ? Or was it meant
that they should use such taxing power as they had for that purpose, and no more ? If the former is the sound construction, then
the limit upon the taxing power is nugatory, and it makes no difference how strongly the legislature, or the charter adopted by
the people, may forbid excessive taxation, the authorities of the
city may, by resorting to the power to make contracts, impose
upon the property-holders a tax unlimited in amount or duration.
The wisdom of that provision in the Code, and in the charter of
the city of Burlington, has been amply vindicated by events occurring since their enactment, and they should not be lightly set
aside.
As it appears then to the Court, that the city authorities have
already levied for the present year, a tax as large as the law permits, no writ of mandamus can rightfully issue to compel them to
levy more.
The demurrer of plaintiff being to the whole answer, is overruled,
and the application for a writ of mandamus is refused.
The importance of the questions dis- mi.in the foregoing opinion, will more
cussed and decided by Mr. Justice Mmi- fully appear when it is considered that

UNITED STATES vs. MAYOR, &a., Of BURLINGTON.
the charters of mosi of the western, if not
eastern cities, contain limitations on the
power of taxation similar to those contained in the charter of the city of Burlington, andwhen it is further considered
that many of these cities, in the flush
and prosperous times preceding 1857,
contracted heavy debts by way of subscriptions to the stock of railway companies, for internal improvements, and
for other purposes. Its practical importance, therefore, as well as the high
position and ability of the Judge who
delivered the opinion, well justifies its
publication.
The case is suggestive of a few though ts
which we will briefly present. We have
given in a note the sections of the Code
to which the opinion refers, in order
that the reader might have a clear view
of all the statute law bearing on the
subject.
I. The first remark we make is, that
there is nothing in the opinion which
favors the idea that cities will be allowed
to evade the performance of their legal
obligations to their creditors. If the organic law of a municipal corporation
contains no limitation on the rate of taxation, there is nothing in the judgment
under consideration which denies the
right of a judgment-creditor to a specific
or other sufficient tax immediately to pay
his debt. In the absence of such limitation on the taxing power, then, if the
creditor has been prudent enough to stipulate for the levy of a specific tax, it
cannot be doubted that his rights would,
if necessary, be enforced against the delinquent tribunal or debtor by mandamus.
And where, as in the principal case,
there is a limitation, it is very plainly
intimated, and doubtless would have
been so decided if the case had called
for it, that the debtor corporation would,
if necessary to pay the judgment, be
compelled to levy the maximum rate

authorized by its charter. Thes? observations may be extended to and applied, mutatis mutandis, to countles and
other civil corporations.
II. In regard to the decision of the
main point involved, no reason is seen
to question its correctness. The creditor had not stipulated for the levy of a
special tax to'pay his debt. The charter
of the city contained, at the time the
debt was created, an express provision,
"the wisdom of which," according to
Mr. Justice MILLER, "has been amply
vindicated" by experience, limiting the
taxing power. The object of this provision is obvious-to secure the citizen
and property-owner against onerous and
excessive taxation. The sections of the
Code of Iowa relied on by the relator
were held by the Court, and we think
correctly, not to confer the right upon
the city to levy taxes to an amount
greater than the charter-rate. These
sections occur in the general statutes
of the State in the chapter on "Executions." They do not confer upon the
city a distinct, substantive, gront of the
power of taxation; but can have effect by
compelling the city to levy, in accordance
with its charter and as far as it has the
power to do so, a tax to pay the debt.
The case before the Court, then, was
one where the charter of the city prohibited a rate of taxation for any one year
to "exceed one dollar on each one hundred dollars' worth of property taxed."
That amount the city had actually levied.
The Court held that more could not be
legally required of it. The legal principles upon which this portion of the decision rests seem to the writer to be
plain. No lawyer will question the correctness of the proposition that neither
a city nor any other civil body can
exercise the right or power of taxation unless such power or right be expressly conferred by the Legislature.
Recognising this well-known principle,
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it is said in a very recent case (12 Iowa
545), "that no property can lawfully be
taxed until the Legislature authorizes it
to be done, and when the act requires it
to be done in a particular way, that way
alone can be pursued." It follows that
if the Legislature has conferred no power
of this kind, the city or other political
body can exercise none. If such power
is delegated to a limited exteut, it can
be exercised to that extent, but no further. It seems, also, necessarily to follow, that the power to create a liability
does not per se imply or carry with it the
power to levy and collect a tax to discharge such liability. The grant ofpower
to levy and collect taxes must be clear,
distinct, and express. In the charter
of the city of Burlington the same grant
which gave the power contained also the
limitations upon the extent to which it
might be exercised.
The precise question decided in the
foregoing case has not, to the writer's
knowledge, at least as respects cities,
It was
been elsewhere adjudicated.
raised in the case of The Commonwealth
ex tel. Hamilton vs. The Council of the
City of Pittsburgh, 34 Pa. St. Rep. 496.
By the Act of 1804, incorporating the
town of Pittsburgh, the levy of a tax in
any one year exceeding half a cent on
the dollar was prohibited except upon
certain conditions, which had not been
complied with. But the Court held that
as the special Act of 1853, which authorized the city to subscribe the stock,
also authorized it to borrow money and
to provide funds for its payment by the
levy and collection of such taxes as
might be necessary, that this amounted
to a repeal pro tanto of any prior statutory restrictions (if any there were) upon
the exercise of the right of taxation.
But the principle involved in the leading case is everywhere admitted. Thus,
in the Elementary Treatise on the subject
the law is thus stated and the authorities

cited :-

The power to levy the tax is

a limited one, and if the limits prescribed
by the law are transcended, the levy is
void-" Blackwell on Tax Titles .190.
"The power of taxation is the highest
attribute of sovereignty. It cannot be
enforced against the citizen unless it is
clearly and distinctly authorized by
law." Id. 194. "A municipal corporation or other inferior organization
possesses no power to levy taxes not
expressly authorized by its act of incorporation. Where they are thus authorized they must, in the exercise of the
power, conform to the principles and
requirements of the constitution." Id.
196, 197. "The exercise of the power
to levy taxes by the fiscal agents or officers of a county, city, town, &c., is not
a judicial, but a ministerial act, and is
discretionary within the limits prescribed
by law." Id. 196.
In the case of Kemper vs. McClelland's
Lessee, 19 Ohio 308-a case in many respects strikingly like the one under
review-these general principles were
applied. A law of Ohio provided that
taxes to be levied for county purposes
should not "exceed three mills on the
dollar." The commissioners, notwithstanding, imposed a tax of four and a
half mills, and the Court held that the
levy and all tax sales made to pay the
same were unauthorized and void.
III. Other questions might be suggested, but cannot be -discussed at this
time. Can the Legislature, for example,
as against an existing creditor by an
amendment to the law reduce the limit
or abridge the power of taxation?
Again :-On the answer of the City,
in the principal case, that it had levied
a general tax as large as the law permitted, the Court denied a mandamus to
compel the levy of a special tax.- On the
general tax the judgment-creditor would
have no lien. And as officers of municipal corporations are generally held not
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3ubject to garnishment, the creditor
could acquire no lien on the proceeds
of such general tax. Suppose the City,
when the tax was collected, should refuse
to pay the judgment-creditor, could not
the Courts compel it to do so by mandamus or other appropriate remedy? Suppose the City should act in bad faith and
misappropriate the tax, could not the
Courts, by injunction or otherwise, protect the creditor and compel the City to
do right? But suppose the City, without acting in positive bad faith, should
need or appropriate all the general tax
in carrying on the legitimate functions
of the corporation, such as paying officers, repairing streets, &c., &c., can it
be restrained from so doing by a judgment.-creditor? Has. a judgment-creditor, under such circumstances, the right

to be paid and to insist, if necessary,
that the officers of a city, or at least that
those who extend credit to it afterwards,
shall take the scrip or credit of the city,
and in their turn obtain judgment and
payment? Has a judgment-creditor any
greater rights than a non-judgment creditor? If so, are judgments to be paid
in the order of their date? -These and
similar queries of a like practical character may be started, to manyof which
it would be difficult to find answers in
.cases already adjudged. They open to
an inviting field, on the confines of which
even, we cannot enter dt this time. We
propose to give the results of our explorations of it on a future occasion, if not
anticipated by. others.
J. F. D,
DAvre

nT, Iowa.

Supreme Court.of Maine.
SUMNER A. PATTEN VS. ANDREW WIGGIN.
Physicians and surgeons who offer themselves to the public as practitioners, mpliedly promise thereby, that they possess the requisite knowledge and skill to
enable them to treat such cases as they undertake with reasonable success.
This rule does not require the possession of the highest, or even the airerage, skill,
knowledge, or experience, but only such aswill enable them to treat the case
:.understandingly
and safely.
The law also implies that in the treatment of all cases which ,tiey undertake, they
will exercise reasonable and ordinary care and diligence.
They are also bound aways to use their best skill and judgment iii determining
the natlre of the malady and the best mode of treatment, aiid in all respects to
do. their best to secure a perfect restoration of their patients to health and
soundness.
But physicians and surgeons do not impliedly warrant the recovery of their patients, and are not liable on account of any failure in that respect, unless
through some default of their own duty, as already defined.
If the settled practice and law of the profession allows of but one course of treatment in the case, then any departure from such course might properly be regarded as the result of want of knowledge, skill, experience, or attention.
If there are different schools of practice, all that any physician or surgeon underVO. XI.-26
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takes is, that he understands, and will faithfully treat the case according to the
recognised law and rules of Us particular school.

Action, assumpsit on account annexed.

One portion of the ac-

count is for professional services as a physician, in attendance on
defendant's minor son.
The defence to this portion of the claim was malpractice in the
treatment of the patient, and such ignorance, want of skill and judgment on the part of the plaintiff in managing professionally the case
under his care, that the patient was more injured than benefited by
his treatment, and that on the whole case he was not reasonably entitled to recover anything for his services.
Evidence was introduced on both sides as to such treatment and
management by the plaintiff, during the whole time the patient was
under his care.
The Court (Judge KENT) instructed the jury that if the plaihtiff
had been guilty of malpractice, or neglect, or want of ordinary care
and skill, within the rules hereafter stated, it would be a defence to
that part of the claim which related to the treatment of plaintiff's
son,-the Court instructed the jury as follows :1. When a man offers himself to the public or to patients as a
physician or surgeon, the law requires that he be possessed of that
reasonable degree of learning, skill, and experience which is ordinartly possessed by others of his profession who are in good standing
as to qualifications, and which reasonably qualify him to undertake
the care of patients.
This rule does not require that he should have the highest skill,
or largest experience, or most thorough education, equal to the
most eminent of the profession in the whole country; but it does
require that he should not, when uneducated,.ignorant, and unfitted,
palm himself off as a professional man, well qualified, and go ort
blindly and recklessly to administer medicines, or perform surgical
operations. The rule above stated is the true one.
But a physician qualified *ithin this rule may be guilty of neg1
ligence or malpractice.
2. The law requires, and implies, as part of the contract, that
when a physician undertakes professional charge of a patient,
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he will use reasonable and ordinary care and diligence in the treatment of the case.
3. The law further implies, that he agrees to use his best skill
and judgment, at all times, in deciding upon the nature of the disease, and the best mode of treatment, and the management generally of the patient. The essence of the contract is, that he is to do
his best-to yield to the use and service of his patient his best
knowledge, skill, and judgment, with faithful attention by day and
night as reasonably required. But there are some things that the
law does not imply or require. He is not responsible for want of
success in his treatment, unless it is proved to result from want of
ordinary care, or ordinary skill and judgment. He is not a warranter of a cure, unless he makes a special contract to that effect.
If he is shown to possess the qualifications stated in the first proposition, to authorize and justify him in offering his services as a
physician, then if he exercises his best skill and judgment, with care
and careful observation of the case, he is not responsible for an
honest mistake of the nature of the disease, or as to the best mode
of treatment, when there was reasonable ground for doubt or uncertainty.
If the case is such that no physician of ordinary knowledge or
skill would doubt or hesitate, and but one course of treatment would
by such professional men be suggested, then any other course of
treatment might be evidence of a want of ordinary knowledge or
skill, or care and attention, or exercise of his best judgment, and
a physician might be held liable, however high his former reputation. If there are distinct and differing schools .of practice, as
Allopathic or Old School, Homcopathic, Thompsonian, Hydropathic, or Water Cure, and a physician of one of those schools is
called in, his treatment is to be tested by the general doctrines of
his school, and not by those of other schools. It is to be presumed
that both parties so understand it. The jury are not to judge-by
determining which school, in their own view, is best. Apply these
rules to the evidence.
Then, as to medical and surgical treatment of the case,--was
there, or was there not, a want of ordinary skill and judgment,
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such as to render the plaintiff liable within the above rules-such
evidence as satisfies you that he either did not possess the education, judgment, and skill which authorized him to undertake the
case and enabled him to treat it with ordinary skill, or that he was
guilty of that neglect or carelessness in the treatment or investigation of the case which showed that he did not faithfully and honestly apply his skill, and knowledge, and best judgment.
Defendant requested the Court to give the following instruction:A physician who, upon request and in consideration of being paid
for his services, takes charge of the case of a diseased person, warrants that he possesses and promises to exercise the knowledge,
skill, and care requisite to enable him to understand the nature of
his disease, and to treat it properly, but the degree of such knowledge, skill, and care is not that which is possessed and exercised by
physicians of the highest knowledge, skill, and care, but it is that
possessed by physicians of ordinary knowledge, skill, and care.
The Judge declined to give this, except as given in former instructions.
The Judge, in his charge, also instructed the jury, that in cases
where authorities differ, or "doctors disagree," the competent physician is only bound to exercise his best judgment in determinihg
which course is,on the whole, best.
Verdict for plaintiff for the amount of his bill, to which rulings
and refusal the defeildant excepted.
The case on the exceptions was argued before the Law Court at
the May Term, 1862, and the rulings of the Judge at the trial were
sustained, and the exceptions overruled.
0. A. Everett and J. ff. Rice, for plaintiff.
A. Sanborn, for defendant.
We publish the foregoing case because higher rank in the profession than surit covers the entire ground of the very geons, and are not allowed by the Enginteresting subject. The history of the lish common law to recover pay for their
legal responsibility of medical practi- services, or even for medicines furnished
tioners and surgeons, for malpractice, is by them; their fee being regarded as
curious. Physicians are regarded as a merely an honorary gratuity, the same
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as in the case of a counsellor at law.
But surgeons and apothecaries have always been allowed to maintain actions
to recover compensation for their services, the same as the subordinate ranks
of the profession of the law. And in
this country no distinction has been
made between physicians and surgeons.
Both are allowed to maintain actions for
their services, and both are liable to actions for malpractice. And in the recent
English case of Attorney-General vs.
The Royal College of Physicians, 7 Jur.
N. S. 511, it was held that physicians
might recover for their services on a
special contract.
These actions have been not uncommon in the case of surgeons for a great
number of years, both in England and
America. Surgery is there regarded
much in the nature of a mechanical
trade, and a similar degree of responsibility is attached to the practice of it.
It was originally confined almost exclusively to the barbers, in London
and throughout Great Britain. But the
great amount of learning and skill required in the practice of surgery has
rendered it a highly respectable and
liberal profession throughout the world,
ranking, in many respects, even higher
than the practice of medicine. But the
laws of that profession are far more
cliarly defined, and the consequences
of departure from them much more fully
understood, than in that of medicine;
so that actions are more likely to be
brought, for such departures from the
law of the profession, in surgery than
in medicine, since, being better defined,
they are consequently more susceptible
of proof.
The rule of law applicable to this
class of actions is commonly expressed
in much the same terms which we apply
to any other pecuniary responsibility.
It is, that one who allows himself to be

employed, in any department of the profession, impliedly undertakes that he
possesses such degree of learning, experience, and skill as renders it safe and
proper for him to undertake that particular business, and that he will exercise
these faculties in a careful and faithful
manner. This is the rule laid down in
the principal case, and is sustained by
numerous reported cases. Landon vs.
Humphrey, 9 Conn. R. 209; Howard vs.
Grover, 28 Maine R. 97; Wood vs. Clapp,
4 Sneed 65. But a rule of law laid
down in such general terms is not much
aid to a jury, or much guide to any one,
in determining such questions as arise
upon this subject.
1. It may be assumed that there is
some definite rule, or some well-understood course, for the management of
cases, both in medicine and surgery.
This rule is the law of the medical profession for that case. There may be
cases where different rules obtain and
are sanctioned by allowable authority.
In such cases there is a discretion allowed the practitioner. But every case
of this kind must be tried by the law of
the medical profession, and this law is the
law of the case, and it must be established by witnesses of skill and experience in that profession. BLACK, C. J.,
in McCandless vs. McWha, 22 Penn.
St. R. 261, 274.
2. When the lawf or laws, of the medical profession have been once established,
in any particular case, to the satisfaction
of the triers, it will be safe to affirm,
that every practitioner who allows himself to be employed in that particular
case, impliedly assumed and promised
to his employer, that he knew the approved or allowable rules or laws of the
profession applicable to that case, and
that he would practise them with reasonable care, skill, and diligence. It
is not important whether these laws,
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obtaining in the profession at any given
period, are wise or foolish, reasonable
or unreasonable, any more than it is in
regard to the law of the land. If it be
thc law, it must be followed. And to
this end, all that is requisite is that it
be the settled, generally received, or at
least, allowable, practice of the. profession, at that time.
3. Questions often arise in regard to
the extent of the discretion of the practitioner in the treatment of cases. Where
the course of practice in the profession
is uniform and entirely settled, any one
who departs from it must do so at his
peril. And if any bad results follow in
consequence to the patient, the medical
man is responsible, not only for all pecuniary damages, but even to criminal
prosecution in certain cases. Slater vs.
Baker, 2 Wilson 359. And it is no excuse that the practitioner is'very skilful
and experienced, and that he departed
from the general course of practice in
his profession, with an honest expectation of benefiting his patient. In the
case last cited, the defendant had been
for twenty years the first surgeon in St.
Bartholomew's Hospital, London. The
Court nevertheless held him responsible
in damages for the unfortunate and unforeseen consequences to his patient,
saying, That if this was the first experiment of the kind, it was rash, "and he
who acts rashly acts ignorantly," "an-l
although the defendant, in general, may
be as skilful as any gentleman in England," in his profession, yet, in this particular case. he acted ignorantly, rashly,
and unskilfully, "contrary to the known
rule and usage of surgery." The same
principle is maintained in Speare vs.
Prentice, 8 East 348, and in Lamhier
vs. Phips, 8 C. & P. 47-5, where TiNDAL,
0. J. (C. P.), gives a very clear and satisfactory exposition of the duty of surgeons and physicians. And a surgeon,

or physician, may become responsible
for the mistake or neglect of his apprentice while acting on his behalf. lleineke vs. Hooper, 7 C. & P. 81.
4. One who acts in the capacity of surgeon or physician, as expressed by BA.&LEY, B.. in Rex vs. Long, 4 C. & P, 423,
440, and "has acted with gross and improper rashness and want of caution," and
the life of the patient is thereby sacrificed, will be liable to punishment criminally. There is also a case of considerable interest, Commonwealth vs.
Thompson, 6 Mass. R. 134, where the
founder of the Thompsonian practice,
consisting in the use of vegetable stimulants, who destroyed the life of one of
his patients by the too free use of lobelia,
in repeated doses, was indicted for wilful murder. The accused was tried before Chief Justice PARSONS and a full
Court, and defended by the late Mr.
Justice SToRY, then at the bar. The
case presented the most deplorable ignorance in the respondent, and a degree
of foolhardy presumption and dogged
perseverance, which certainly should
have exposed him to a conviction for
manslaughter. But the law was laid
down so favorably to the right of the
people to be cured, or killed, in their
own way, that the trial resulted in an
acquittal. And the rule of the English
law has been laid down very favorably
to the accused in such cases. In Rex
vs. Martin, 2 Carrington & Payne 625.
in a trial at the Old Bailev, before
three Judges, it was decided, That if
a person, bona fide and honestly exercising his best skill to cure a patient,
perform an operation, which causes
the patient's death, he is not guilty of;
manslaughter, and it makes no difference
whether such person be a regular surgeon or not; nor whether he has had a
regular medical education or not. But
the rule in most of the English cases
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apon this subject is, that where an ignorant man, without any necessity, voluntarily undertakes delicate and difficult
operations in surgery, and is therein
guilty of gross ignorance or reckless disregard of life, and death ensues, he is
guilty of manslaughter. Rex vs. Long,
4 .. & P. 398. Rex vs. Stimpson, in note
to the last case; where Mr. Justice BAYLEY said, "If a person not of medical
education, rhere professional aid might
be obtained, undertakes to administer
medicine which might have a dangerous
effect, and thereby occasions death, such
person is guilty of manslaughter."
5. The cases in this country where
the responsibility of the medical profession his been brought in question, have
been mostly civil actions. And it does
not seem that the medical man is in general responsible for mere mistakes or
errors in judgment. McLallen vs. Adams,
19 Pick. 333, where the employer attempted to defend against the surgeon's
action for his bill of fees, and it was held
that where the wife of the defendant was
afflicted with a dangerous disease, and
was carried by him a distance from home
and left under the care of the plaintiff
as surgeon, and after the lapse of some
weeks the plaintiff performed an operation for her cure, soon after which she
died; that the performance of the operition was within the scope of the plaintiff's authority, if in his judgment it was
necessary or expedient, and that he was
not bound to prove that it was necessary
under the circumstances. It has sometimes been considered that the case of
Howard vs. Grover, 28 Maine 97, made the
surgeon responsible for the consequences

derstand that case as having gone
that length, precisely. It is there ex..
pressly said that the defendant is not
liable for want of the highest degree of
skill, and a distinction is adverted to
between the degree of skill to be expected from country practitioners and those
who have the advantage of extensive
city hospital practice.
6. A professional man is as much
bound to keep pace with the advance of
knowledge in his department, as he is
to study its laws, originally. McCandless vs. McWh a, 22 Penn. St. R. 261. But
he is not an insurer of the recovery and
final perfect restoration of his patients,
either in medicine or surgery. Since
the cure of a broken limb, even if so
fractured as ordinarily to result in a
perfect cure, is liable to many contingencies which do not attend mere dead
mechanism. McCandless vs. McWha,
8upra. But in the trial of an action to
recover the amount of a dentist's bill,
Chief Justice SHEPLEY charged the jury,

"that if the plaintiff exercised all the
knowledge and skill to which the art
had at the time advanced, that would
be all that would be required of him ;"
but the full bench regarded this as too
high a standard of professional duty,
and ordered a new trial. Simonds vs.
Henry, 39 Maine 155.
7. Nor is any man in any profession
bound to exercise' the .highest degree
of skill and science. The character of
these attainments in different persons
in allprofessions and pursuits is of almost infinite variety in amount and degree of perfectness. The extent of one's
practice very soon makes the greatest
of an error in judgment in amputating a possible difference in the fees demanded
limb so far from the body as not to re- by him for difficult operations, and also
move all of the diseased bone. But if in his skill, resulting from that dexthat was intended to be there decided, terity which can only be acquired by
the case is not maintainable either upon such enlarged practice. So that the
principle or authority. But we do un- mere novice, who is known not to have
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had any experience in his profession,
by no means undertakes for the same
degree of skill, with the practitioner of
half a century. So also the country practitioner in a remote provincial town cannot be said to owe the same degree of
skill to his patients as he who has had
the advantages of constant and extensire city and hospital practice. The most
which inexperienced practitioners owe,
either to themselves or their patients,
is, not to be persuaded to undertake
matters in their profession of such difficulty as to be beyond their knowledge
and experience. It is perhaps here that
medical men are most liable to fail in
the performance of duty. Wood vs. Clapp,
4 Sneed 65.
8. The case of Piper vs. Menifee, 12
B . Mour. 465, presents rather a curious
question in regard to the responsibility
of the medical profession. The plaintiff
who sued for his fees had, during his
attendance upon the defendant, also attended patients infected by small-pox,
and by the want of proper care had
communicated the infection to the defendant and his family, whereby the
plaintiff 'a bill for attendance was greatly
increased, for which defendant claimed
a deduction. The Court held that the
plaintiff could not recover for the additional services rendered necessary by
his own want of proper care, and that
the defendant was entitled to a fr-

ther deduction from that portion of the
bill which was properly chargeable, sufficient to reimburse him for all damages

which he had sustained by bodily suffering and loss of time.
9. The law presumes that physicians
and surgeons perform their duty unless
the contrary be shown, as in other cases
where misconduct is charged. Bellinger
vs. Craigue, 31 Barb. Sup. Ct. R. 534.
It may be of interest to the profession
to know that Mr. Elwell, of New York,
has within the last few years published a
book upon this subject, -which, as a first
attempt in this department of the law,
is no- obnoxious to criticism, and will
be found very useful to those who may
have occasion to prepare causes for trial
involving questions of this kind.
We have said nothing in regard
to the degree of care and diligence required in the practice of medicine and
surgery. because it is well understood
in the profession, and there is no conflict in regard to the rule. It is such as
a careful and trustworthy man would be
expected to exercise in a case of equal
importance. Different cases require very
different degrees of watchfulness and
attention. This is required to be in proportion to the importance and difficulty
of the case. The cases bearing on the
general question of care and diligence
are collected and digested in Briggs vi;
Taylor, 28 Vt. Rl. 180.
1. F. R.

IN RE STEVENSON vs. LAWRENCE.

In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia.
INY THE MATTER

OF THE PETITION OF WILLIAM C. STEVENSON,

CONTESTING THE ELECTION OF ALBERT LAWRENCE) AS CLERK OF
THE ORPHANS' COURT.
A statute directing a Court to hear'and determine a case "at the next term," does
not prohibit such Court from proceeding to determine it after the expiration of
the term, if the words of the statute are affirmative only.. Such a statute is
merely directory, and negative words-are necessary to oust the jurisdiction of
the Court when it has once attached.

This was a case of contested election for the office of Clerk of
the Orphans' Court.of the County of Philadelphia, and arose under
an Act of July 2d 1839, sect. 5, relating to the election of prothonotaries and clerks, which provided as follows:
"The returns of the elections, under this Act, shall be subject to
the inquiry, determination, and judgment of the Cburt of Common
Pleas of the proper county, upon complaint in writing of thirty or
more of the qualified electors of the proper county of undue election.
or return of any such officer, two of whom shall take and subscribe
an oath or affirmation, that the facts set forth in such complaint
are true, to the best of their knowledge and belief; and the said
court shall, in judging concerning such election, proeqed upon the
merits thereof, and shall determine, finally, concerning the same,
according to the laws of this commonwealth; and the prothonotary
of the said court shall, immediately', certify to the governor, the
decree of the said court on such election, and in whose favor such
contested election shall be terminated, and the go.tern-or shall then
issue the commission to such person in whose favor such contested
election has determined; and the said court shall hear and
determine such contested election, at the next term after the
election shall have been held, and such complaint shall not be valid
or regarded by the court, unless the same shall have been filed in
the prothonotary's offlce within ten days after the election; and.
in case such complaint is filed within the time above mentioned, it
shall be the duty of the prothonotary to transmit by mai], immo-
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diately, to the governor, a certified copy thereof, and in such case,
no commission shall be issued until the court shall have determined
and adjudged on such complaint as aforesaid."
The petition was filed November 22d 1861, and the next term
of the Court commenced on the first Monday of December following, and expired on the 2d of March 1862. The cause had been
on trial for a considerable time, and it was impossible, owing to the
great number of witnesses, and the intricate nature of the case,
to finish it before March 2d 1862, when the December term expired. On March 5th 1862, motions were made on behalf of the
respondent : 1st. That the case be no further proceeded with.
2d. That the complaint be dismissed, on the ground that the time
prescribed by the statute for hearing and disposing of the same
has elapsed.
These motions were argued the same day by counsel, and an
oral opinion given by THOMPSON, P. J., that the Court was bound
to go on, and ,finally decide" the case, and that the motions be
refused. LUDLOW, J., was of opinion that the power of the Court
over the case had ceased by limitation of law, and that the petition
should be dismissed. A further difference of opinion arose as to
what entry should be made on the record, where the Court was
equally divided in opinion upon a question of jurisdiction. Subsequently, the whole matter was re-argued before a full bench.
L. C. Cassidy and W. L. Hfirst, for respondent.-The Act directing the cause to be determined at the next term must be held
to be imperative, and to prohibit any decision of the case after the
expiration of that term. The legislature las said the complaint
shall be filed within a certain time, and the case shall be finished
within a certain time. After the expiration of the term, the power
of the Court over the case ceases, and the complainants are out
of court. Carpenter's Case, 2 Harris 486; B igham vs. Cabot, 3
Dallas 19. The law requires that the case ,shall be heard and
determined at the next term," and this is equivalent to saying that
it shall not be heard after the next term. Where the judges divide
on a question of jurisdiction, the case cannot go on.
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G. .. C'onarroe and 1. Carroll Brewster, for complainants.The Act of Assembly is merely directory as to the time in which
the case shall be decided. The Court is not prohibited from hearing the cause after the term, if it has been commenced in proper
time. No negative words are used, and such words are necessary
to make a statute prohibitory in such a case as this. A statute
directing a public officer to d a certain thing within a certain time
is directory only, unless he is restrained from doing it after that
time: Rex vs. Sparrow, 2 Str. 1123; Rex vs. Loxdale, 1 Burr.
447; Pond vs. NVegus, 8 Mass. 230; People vs. Allen, 6 Wend.
486; People vs. Cook, 14 Barb. 290; Walker vs. Chapman, 22
Ala. 126; BRyan vs. Valandigham, 7 Ind. 416; Rex vs. Justices
of Leicester, 7 B. & 0. 13. The petition must be filed within a
certain 'time, because the legislature has said that if not so filed
it shall ,not. be valid or regarded by the Court." No such words
are used in reference -to the time in which the case shall be decided. It is simply to be determined " at the next term." The
Court is asked to insert by implication the words " and not after."
This cannot be done. The legislature only meant the case to be
heard and decided with all convenient speed. They did not expect the Court to perform physical impossibilities: Covanhovan vs.
Hart, 9 Harris 502. Under the certiorari law (Purd. 316), cases
are required to be decided ,at the term to which they'are returnable," yet it is not an uncommon practice for the Court to decide
them after the term. The jurisdiction is exclusive, and the case
must be decided by this Court or not at all: Carpenter's Case, 2
Harris 486. The jurisdiction of the Court having attached, it
cannot be divested by delay in rendering judgment. The construction put upon the Act by the respondent, would lead to the most
absurd results, viz. : that the case can never be decided ; that the
Governor can issue no commission; and that a large body of voters
are to be disfranchised. The Court having been divided upon The
motion it falls, and the proper entry on the record should be
",motion overruled."
The opinion of the Court was delivered by
ALLISON, J.-When the case was last before the Court it was

IN RE STEVENSON vs. LAWRENCE.

upon a motion to dismiss the petition of the contestant and that the
Court do not proceed further with the cause. Upon this motion
the Court, as then constituted, divided in opinion, my brother LUDLOW being in favor of the motion, and my brother THOmpSON against
it; the former holding that the jurisdiction of the Court over the
case was at an end, expressing his willingness to hear the evidence
in the cause, and the latter being of the opinion that it was not out
of Court, but before them for decision and final determination.
Upon this state of facts the Court being unable to proceed, on
the invitation of my brethren I have come into this cause upon the
question as formally stated to me, "what entry should be made upon
the record, where the Court is equally divided in opinion on a
question of jurisdiction ?" The precise point raised by this question was, however, abandoned practically by the counsel on both
sides, and the question considered by them, and to which the attention of the Court was mainly directed, was, what is the tr e and
proper construction of the fifth section of the act of July 2d, 1839,
providing for the election of prothonotaries, &c., under which law
the petition of William C. Stevenson was filed in this Court.
The difficulty which has arisen in the cause, is as to the true
intent and meaning of the clause of the said section, which says,
"and the Court shall hear and determine such contested election
at the next term after the election shall have been held." This,
it is contended, is imperative upon the Court, and that if the election contested shall not have been determined before the expiration of the next term, the case drops for want of further jurisdiction.
In the construction of statutes affirmative words enjoining the
performance of an act by a public officer, are generally regarded as
directory only; negative words will make a statute imperative, and
it is apprehended affirmative may, if they are absolute, explicit,
peremptory, and show that no discretion is intended to be given.
Dwarris on Statutes 715. "If
to the clause under consideration, the
words and not after had been added, we would have a perfect illustration of the principle stated; these words of negation would convert
that which in its ordinary signification is but directory into a com-
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mand; taking from the Court all discretionary power, by the use
of language imperative and compulsory. It would require the
clearest possible case, where the language used was affirmative only,
under the well-settled rules of interpretation of statutes, to justify
a Court in holding such language to be imperative; in the terms
of Dwarris, just cited, it must be absolute, explicit, peremptory.
In the act now before us, the distinction is clearly taken by the
Legislature ; no better illustration could be cited, when it says, "and
such complaint shall not be valid or regarded by the Court unless
the same shall have been filed in the Prothonotary's office within
ten days after the election." Here is a clear liii itation upon the
power of the Court; the language employed leaves no door open for
question or doubt. -"Shall not be valid or regarded by the Court,"
has but one signification; negatives the power to take action upon
the complaint, by the use of language absolute, explicit, peremptory, unless the condition precedent has been complied with.
In the case of The People vs. Cook, 14 Barbour 293, the principle is stated thus: Statutes directing a mode of proceeding of
public officers are regarded as directory, unless there is something
in the statute which shows a different intent. So, also, in People
vs. Allen, 6 Wendell 486. A statute which requires a public
officer to perform an official act regarding the rights and duties of
others, is directory merely, unless the nature of the act to be performed, or the language used'by the Legislature, show that the
designation of the time was intended as a limitation of the power
of- the officer.
Lord MANSFIELD, in Rex vs. Loxdale, 1 Burr. 447, .says: There
is a known distinction between things required to be done by act
of Parliament and clauses merely directory. In Reox vs. Sparrow,
2 Strange 1123, the appointment of overseers was held to be valid,
though made after the time designated in the act. The statute 54
George III. prescribed the times for holding Courts of Quarter Sessions. It was decided that Quarter Sessions held at other time .
were always considered good. So also the statute of 43 Elizabeth
directed apprentices to be bound out till twenty-four years of age:
a binding under the statute till twenty-one was held to be good.

IN RE STEVENSON vs. LAWRENCE.

Under our election laws the ruling has been frequent and uniform
in this and other courts, that numerous requirements of the law,
enjoining upon election officers the performance of specific acts.
when not coupled with a question of fraud, were regarded as
directory merely; and not to vitiate the election when omitted to
be done; nor the act itself, when imperfectly performed, or performed out of time. The 4th section of our Habeas Corpus Act
provides, that if any person committed for treason or felony, shall
not be indicted and tried in the next term after such commitment,
it shall be lawful for the Judges or Justices, and they are thereby
required, to set at liberty such persons on bail. The language here
used is imperative, "and they are hereby required." Yet it was
held in Common wealth vs. The Jailer,&c., 7 Watts 366, that a person laboring under an infectious disease is not entitled of right
under this section to be tried at the next term. Other exceptions
are recognised in 16 Serg. & R. 305, 2 Wharton 501, and 1
Dallas 9.
The ninth section of the same act imposes upon any Judge or
Justice, who, on application, shall refuse or neglect to award a
writ of habeas corpus, a penalty of three hundred pounds. The
Supreme Court in Ex parte Laurence, 5 Binney 304, and in the
more recent case of Passmore Ifilliamson, 2 Casey 9, construed
this section to mean, that Judges were not bound on every complaint of illegal restraint of liberty to allow the writ. These last
two instances of the construction which has been given to statutes,
are strongly in point; for they are statutes in favor of the liberty
of the citizen; in one, the language is that of command, and in the
other, a penalty is imposed for a refusal to obey the requirements
of the law.
Upon the argument, our own statutes relating to the writs of quo
warranto and certiorari were cited in support of the view taken
by the contestant: the same language in substance is used, as in
the act under consideration. •"Shall be heard and decided at the
term to which it is returnable." "And the Court shall at the term,
to which the proceedings of the justices of the peace are returnable
in pursuance of writs of certiorari,determine and decide thereon."
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The practical construction given to these acts by this and other
Courts, has not limited the power of the Court to the term to which
these writs were made returnable. It is, however, but due to the
cause to say that no reported case was cited in which the point had
been considered and decided. These authorities, to my mind, settle
clearly the point that the language employed in the Act of July
2d,. 1839, requiring the cause to be decided at the next term, is
but directory, and ought to be so regarded, unless there be something in the statute which shows a different intent, and which would
therefore require us to give to it a different construction. The first
element to be extracted from this or any other statfite in our search
after its true signification, is to ascertain, if we can, its spirit and
intent. The object .to be at attained was to enable the Court of
Common Pleas to inquire, determine, and judge of an undue election or return, upon the complaint of thirty or more qualified
electors. The Court are enjoined in judging concerning said election to proceed upon the merits, and to determine finally concerning
the same, according to the laws of this Commonwealth; then follows
the clause upon which the Court differed in opinion, "and the said
Court shall hear and determine such contested election at the next
term after the election shall have been held."
The design of the law was to secure an investigation of a matter
in which citizens generally and the candidate claiming.title to the
office by election, were deeply interested; questions are involved
in such an issue, of the gravest importance, affecting alike the
highest principles of honesty and fair dealing between man and man,
and the purity of the ballot box, and the vindicatio4 of the elective
right of the citizens of the Commonwealth; to guard those rights,
each of them sacred, and worthy of legislative protection, the Court
are enjoined to investigate the merits of the case and finally determine the same according to law; this I hold is the material intent
of the Legislature; but inasmuch as they directed that a commission should not issue upon a contest being certified to the Governor,
until the Court shall have determined and adjudged on the complaint filed, they directed the Court to hear and determine the
same at the next .term; but suppose, as in this case, the Court, for
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good and sufficient reasons, do not, or cannot hear and determine
the complaint within the time designated, What then? Is the law,
as to the case already in progress before the proper tribunai, to be
regarded as a dead letter ? Are the citizens and contestant alike
to be turned away, and told that the stroke of the clock has paralyzed the arm of the Court, and that they must go without remedy
for an alleged violation of public and private right, because that
which was not of the essence of the thing to be done, has not been
complied with by the officer of the law, either with or without
cause ? I think not: I can gather no such meaning from the act,
and can regard the command as to time, only in the light of an injunction to the Judges to speed the cause, and at the next term, if
possible, fulfil the material requirements of the law, by finally determining the case upon its merits.
Any other view it seems to me reverses the natural order of
things; prefers the unimportant to the material; gives to the minor
consideration, namely, the time within which a decision is to be
rendered, precedence of the more substantial and weighty matters
of the law under consideration ; for certainly it is far more essential
that the Court shall decide the main question, than to allow it to
fall dead before the Judges, who were enjoined to decide it finally
and upon its merits, by language quite as explicit as that used to
indicate the time within which it ought to be determined.
Carpenter's Case seems to have been relied on in support of a
contrary view, but that case decides nothing more than that the
Supreme Court had no revisatory power by certiorariof proceedings under the Act of July 2d, 1839, and that the decision of the
Common Pleas was final-all that Judge GIBsoN says in that case
is by way of argument in support of this proposition, and in my
opinion does not apply to the question now before this Court; nor
does the point appear to have been even incidentally raised in the
Court above; unless the mere citation of the words of the law by
the Chief Justice in support of a totally different principle, are capable of such contruction and application, which I think they
are not.
I am for the reason stated of the opinion that the case of the
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contestant is still in Court for determination and final judgment on
the merits.
Upon the question as to the proper entry to be made 9n the
record, where the Court is equally divided on the question of jurisdiction, I do not deem it necessary to say more than that the case
of Bingham vs. Cabot, 3 Dallas 19, cited upon the argument by
the counsel for the respondent, is to be regarded only as if a motion
for a venire de novo had been made, which motion fell because the
Court were equally divided upon the question as to whether the
Court below had jurisdiction of the original cause of action.
LuDLOW,

J., dissented.

The case t was subsequently determined in favor of the contestant.
I. The foregoing case has never been
reported, and as it embodies the judgment of a court having exclusive jurisdiction of the matter in controversy, it
is well worthy -of preservation. It is
also, we believe, the only case in Pennsylvania where the clauge of the Act of
2d July 1839, directing certain contested
elections to be decided at the next term
after they are commenced, has received
a judicial construction. In Carpenter's
Case, 2 Harris 486, the Supreme Court
of Pennsylvania, in an opinion delivered
by Chief Justice Gimson; decided that
the determination of the Common Pleas
as to the election of a prothonotary or
clerk, was, by virtue of tho fifth section
of the Act of 2d July 1839, finaZ, and
quashed a writ of certiorari which-had
issued to remove the proceedings in
such a case. Carpenter's Case has
never been overruled, though a minority
of the judges have since contended for
the power to issue a certiorari for the
purpose of examining the regularity of
the proceedings of the court below, but
not to rejudge the merits. Scheetz's
Case, cited in note to Br. Purd. 681, ed.
1853 ; and the still later case of the certiorari to Luzerne Co. in the matter of
VOL. XI.-27

the contested election of E. B. Collings,
determined in March, 1862.
II. The rule of interpretation enunciated by the Commbn Pleas in this case,
is of importance, beyond the point decided in the particular cause. The
opinion of the Court defines clearly the
rules governing the construction of statutes, and establishes, we think, with
much ability, the true distinction between those provisions in a statute, as
to time, which are merely directory, and
those which are prohibitory. Where
acts are directed to be done by publie
officers, and especially where acts, regarding the rights of the public or of
private suitors, are directed to be done
by judicial officers,'at a certain time,
the acts may be done afterwards, even
where a penalty is provided for their
omission at the proper time. And the
cases, generally; have been determined
on the very proper ground that it is
unjust to deprive, the public or private
suitors of rights which they have not
forfeited by any neglect of their own.
Thus in the case of Rex vs. Sparrow, 2
Strange 1123, the justices had been
guilty of a neglect in not appointing
overseers of the poor within due time,
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and a mandamus was issued by the
King's Bench to compel them to appoint
them afterwards for the sake of the poor.
And Lord MANSFIELD, in Rex vs. Loxdale, 1 Burr. 445, said: "the poor could
not have had a specific
remedy in that case,
unless the justices might appoint after"
the precise time," and that the act of 43
Eliz. ,did not mean that the poor should
lose the equity and benefit of the act, if the
justices did not appoint within that
time." The principle of the decision in
Stevenson vs. Lawrence is the same.
The public, who are mainly interested
in preventing and overturning frauds at
elections, are not to lose their statutory
right to a judicial investigation in cases
of contested elections, where they have
been guilty of no laches. The public
can have no control over the time which
may be necessary for a proper hearing
and determination of a cause by the judiciary, which time may, aind, indeed,
must vary greatly, according to the circumstances of each particular case, and
the pressure of business before the
Court. Where, however, an act is to be
done by the public, or by any number
of citizens on behalf of the public, within
a certain time, the same reason does not
exist for holding the command of the
statute to be but directory, as in the
other case, because it may be entirely
within the power of the parties to perform the specified act within the time
designated, and consequently, if they
do not, they are guilty of laches.
III. The recent case of Horton & Heil
vs. Miller, 2 Wright 270, might seem at
first glance to conflict with the foregoing
decision in Stevenson vs. Lawrence, but
an examination of the case will show
that it is entirely reconcilable with it,
and serves to illustrate the distinction

taken between acts to be done 1y a
court, and acts to be done by a party.
The syllabus states broadly that "a
court term is a definite and fixed term
prescribed by law for the administration
of judicial duties, within which the!
btisiness of the term should be trans-1
acted. Terms may be extended to a
period of time outside of their proper
limits by adjournment, but the fixed term
is not thereby enlarged." The facts of
the case were these. The plaintiff declared on an insolvent bond, executed
by defendants, dated June 21st 1858, in
the penal sum of $360, upon condition
that Horton, one of the defendants,
should appear "at the next term of the
Court of Common Pleas of Schuylkill
county," and then and there present
his petition for the benefit of the insolvent laws, &c. The next term was September Term, 1858, which commenced
September 6th, and by law was to continue four weeks. The defendant, Horton, did not appear within that time, or
present any petition for the benefit of
the insolvent laws. The term was adjourned to December 2d, 1858. On November 25th, 1858, suit was brought on
the bond, and the Court decided that
nothing having been done within the
time specified in the bond (which was
held to be the four weeks fixed by law
for the duration of the term), the condition was held to have been broken,
and the plaintiffs' case was sustained.
The act of omission, however, was an
act to be done by a party, the defendant,
and of course the direction as to time
was held to be imperative. This case,
therefore, does not in the least impeach
the doctrine of Stevenson vs. Lawrence.
M.

UNITED STATES vs. 129 PACKAGES.

United States District Court, Eastern District of Aissouri.-S ecial Term, September, 1862.
UNITED STATES vs. ONE HUNDRED

AND

TWENTY-NINE

PACKAGES,

W. H. PROBASCO) CLAIMANT.
The Act of Congress of July 13th 1862, is not a penal but a revenue statute, and
is to be construed liberally, so as to accomplish its proposed object.
Where a party for fraudulent purposes mixes up, goods prohibited by a revenue
act with those not prohibited, the whole will be forfeited.
A citizen may be forbidden by a municpal law to do what would be iawful for a
neutral to do on the high seas.
A sale of contraband property to a belligerent in a neutral territory is a violation
of neutrality, and, a fortiori, such sale in one belligerent country by a citizen or
domiciled person theieof, is a breach of allegiance.
Hence the Act of July 13th 1861, prohibits every act done towards the execution
of a design to carry on, without a "permit," commercial intercourse between the
interdicted and other states, and it is violated not only when avessel has actually
sailed with the goods on board, but the moment the goods -are startetl, even on
land, towards the forbidden destination. The application for a "permit" is evi'deuce of the intention to proceed, and the use of fraudulent invoices to procure
the "permit,"

shows the intention to be fraudulent.

The shipment of goods

under color of that permit, is a step taken in execution of that fraudulent intent
-is

an overt act.

Such goods are "proceeding to" the interdicted port within

the meaning of the Act of July 13th 1861, and the shipper, under the Act of
May 20th 1862, is guilty of an "attempt" to transport them in violation of law.
The condition of peace or war, public or civil, in a legal sense, mus be determined
by the political department of the Government, and the Courts are. bound by
that decision.
By the Act of July 13th 1861,.the prohibition of commercial intercourse is to be
iii force "so

long as such condition of hostility shall continue."

The same

power which determines the existence of war or insurrection, must also decide
when "the condition of hostility" ceases.

In a legal sense the state of war or

peace is not a question in pais for Courts to determine. It is a legal fact ascer
tainable only from the decision of the political department.
Hence, when the President has proclaimed a State to be ininsurrection, the Courts
must hold that this condition continues until he decides to the contrary.
The same rules apply as to the exceptions from the interdict, of such parts of the
insurrectionary States "as may maintain a loyal adhesion to the Union and the
Constitution, or may be from time to time occupied and controlled by forces of"
the United States engaged in the dispersion of said insurgents." Such exceptions, and the legal status of such parts of the said States, are to be determined
by the President. *
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Libel of information under the Act of Congress, July 13th, 1861.
7Y. W. Edwards and C. S. Hayden, for the United States.
J. K. Knight, for claimant.
The case is fully stated in the opinion by
TREAT, J.-The facts submitted in this cas are substantially these:
The claimant proposing to make a shipment of merchandise to
Memphis in the State of Tennessee, applied to the surveyor of the
port of St. Louis for a permit, under the regulations of the Secretary of the Treasury pursuant to the Act of July 13th 1861.
He represented that the proposed shipment contained, among other
things, 100 barrels of cement. A "permit" having been granted
for the specified goods, the claimant sent on board of a steamer,
bound for Memphis, said 100 barrels and the 129 packages now in
litigation. The surveyor caused said shipment to be examined
after it was on board of said steamer and whilst she still lay at the
wharf here, and detected, that instead of 100 barrels of cement,
there were 100 barrels of whiskey packed in cement. for the purpose
of concealing the same. Thereupon the whole shipment was seized.
The agreement of facts as filed, states that Memphis, the port of
destination, is not now "in a condition of hostilities" against the
United States, and that it is "occupied and controlled by forces of
the United States, engaged in the dispersion of the insurgents."
The claimant does not interpose a claim for the 100 barrels of
cement and the whiskey packed therein; but solely for the 129
packages which contain no prohibited goods.
The first proposition urged by his proctor, is, that the statute of
July 13th 1861, is a penal statute in derogation of common right,
and consequently it is to be strictly construed.
Common right, it must be observed, requires the bonds of society
to be preserved so as to prevent anarchy, and the coiisequent
destruction of all safeguards for persons and property. Every
member of society is directly interested in its preservation. Governments are instituted for the common good; and when a blow is
aimed thereat, every citizen's rights are assailed. Measures adopted

UNITED STATES vs. 121 PACKAGES.

for the common safety are therefore, generally construed liberally,
or so as to effect the proposed- object.
The theory upon which that rule depends was fully considered in
this Court in the cases of Te United States vs. The Steamboat
Hannibal, Same vs. CTampion, &c., decided at the November term,
1861.
The statute of July 13th 1861, being a revenue statute, is to be
construed according to the rules governing such Acts, and not as a
mere penal enactment. In the case of Taylor vs. The United States,
3 How. 210, the Supreme Court of the United States held: "In
one sense every law imposing a penalty or forfeiture may be deemed
a penal law; in another sense such laws are often dbemed, and truly
deserve-to be called, remedial. The Judge was, therefore, strictly
accurate when he stated (in the Court below) that 'it must not be
understood- that every law which imposes a penalty is therefore,
legally speaking, a penal law-that is, a law which is to be construed
with great strictness in favor of the defendant. Laws enacted for
the. prevention of fraud, for the suppression of a public wrong,
or to effect a public good, are not in the strict sense penal acts,
although they may inflict a penalty for violating them.' And he
added, ' it is in this light I view the revenue laws, and I would
construe them so as most effectually to accomplish the intention of
the Legislature in passing them.' The same distinction will be
found recognised in the elementary writers: as, for example, in
Blackstone's Commentaries (1 B1. Com. 88), and Bacon's Abridgmont, Statutes 1, 7, 8, and Comyn's Digest, ParliamentR. 13, 19,
20, and it is also abundantly supported by authorities.'
Similar decisions may be found in 1 Gall. 124; 2 Peters 358,
627; 16 Peters 342. The justice of that rule was, in the cases referred
to as decided November term 1861, fully discussed by this Court
in the light of right reason, of the nature, objectsi and necessity of
social and governmental organization, and also of the essential
elements of individual safety and happiness.
Surely such statutes, adopted. for the existence of government
against armed efforts for its overthrow, upon the faithful observance
of which the p6ace of society depends. should receive such a con-
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struction as will according to their scope and object effect the pubne
end designed.
Hence, in the interpretation of the Act of July 13th 1861, Courts
are bound to give to it no such narrow and technical construction
as may defeat its salutary purposes.
Allegiance is a primary tie, and treason the greatest of crimes;
for inasmuch as allegiance is the bond by which society exists, so
the breach of that allegiance by direct overt acts, is an attempt to
dissolve social and governmental organization, reducing society to
chaos-a condition in which moral, as well as political, obligations
give way to physical force and blind passion.
The right of each and all, or "common right," is not assailed
when constitutional and remedial measures are adopted for the
common good.
The history of the existing rebellion fully illustrates the doctrine.
The untold calamities it has devolved upon all citizens of the Republic, are too keenly felt'to need exposition.
But whatever rule of interpretation is adopted in this case, the
same result will follow. The claimant admits that he undertook a
fraud upon the law. If the Act of July 13th 1861, was either an
ordinary revenue act, or a simple penal act, he would still fall
within its provisions. He chose for fraudulent purposes to mix up
with unprohibited goods, those directly prohibited. He knew that
the vast interests at stake, civil and military, would admit of no
relaxation of the interdict against intercourse under the Act of
Congress and the President's proclamation, so far at least as the
shipping of whiskey to the insurrectionary States, and to our camps
there, was concerned; yet for his individual gain he was "willing,
not only to jeopard those public interests, but to do so by a resort
to falsehood and fraud. There'can be no pretence that he was
actuated by any higher motive than a sordid lust of gain; which
ignored all considerations of law or justice. He knew that he was
violating the law; and he attempted to defraud the Government,
not in the matter of dollars and cents alone. Still le appears before
the Court with the strange request, to have it unravel for him the
tangled skein of fraud which he has deliberately woven, and then
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restore to his possession such parts as would have been untainted if
he had not wound them into one promiscuous mass. No principle
known to law or equity tolerates such a procedure. He has mixed
up the good with the bad, and the mass must be treated as he has
voluntarily made it. Neither at common law, nor in equity, would
a Court aid in such unclean work. In international law, as illustrated
in prize cases, the owner of a contraband cargo never receives
restitution of any portion of it, when thus tainted with fraud against
the belligerent. It is -a universal maxim, in every department of
jurisprudence, " e x turpi causa, aut ex dolo malo, aut ex maleficio,
non oritur actio;" and in admiralty every claimant is an actor.
If he cannot establish his claim, except through fraud, he is left in
the position he assumed. 8 Wh. 147; 8 Cranch 276, 382, 398;
6 Wh. 169 ; 1 Pet. 547; 12 Wh. 1, 486 ; 2 Cranch 72; 3 Phil.
§ 276; 1 Duer 625, 594; 6 Rob. 125; 1 Rob. 238, 329; 16 East
13; 3 Rob. 178, 221, 295; 2 Rob. 6; 4 Rob.. 68. The intermixture of fraudulent goods with those not prohibited may, or may
not, in some cases be designed to conceal the fraudujent from
detection ; but the law pronounces the whole mass tainted. The
purpose, however, in this case, is transparent. The design was
fraudulent, and the act fraudulent. The whole shipment was one
transaction. If the goods had not been included in one "permit,"
yet, if they were shipped by the same owner, on the "same voyage,
and in the same vessel, they would have shared the same fate.
By the law of prize the concealment or spoliation of papers, or
defective papers, call for explanation from the claimant. An assertion of a false claim, in whole or part, is a substantive cause of
condemnation. A vehement presumption of bad. faith, or gross
prevarication or fraud, or gross misconduct, or illegality, will cause
forfeiture. A party must act in entire good faith, or restitution is
not awarded. The rule extends so far, that if a shipowner lends
his name to cover a fraud with respect to cargo, that circumstance
alone will subject the vessel to condemnation. The fraud taints all
it touches. The Pizarro, 2 Wheaton 241; The Fortuna, 2 Wh.
236; The Venus, 5 Wh. 127; The London Packet, 5 Wh. 132;
The Amiable Isabella, 6 Wh. 1; The Pizarro,2 Wh. 241; The
-Dos Ilermanos, 2 Wh. 76.
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But as the vessel had not left port, or started on the voyage, it
is contended that there has been no violation of the statute; the
language of which is "all goods and chattels, wares and merehan
dise, &c., proceeding to such state or section, by land or water * * *
shall be forfeited." Were the goods in question "proceeding to"
the interdicted section, within the meaning of the. act? It is a
well-established rule, that sailing with an intention to evade a
blockade is a beginning to execute that intention, and an overt act
constituting the offence. From that moment the blockade is fraudulently invaded. The Columbia, 1 Rob. 156 ; The Frederick .AMolke,
1 Rob. 86; The ffoffnung, 6 Rob. 112, 117; The Trou, Johanna,
2 Rob. 109; The Abby, 5 Rob. 256; Pitzsimrons vs. Newport
Insurance Company, 4 Cranch 199; Yeaton vs. _Fry, 5 Cranch
343; The Nereide, 9 Cranch 440, 446; Tie Rugen, 1 Wh. 62.
A concealed illegal destination is proof of a real intention to
break a blockade: The James Cooke, 1 Edw. 261. So a sale in a
neutral country of contraband articles to a belligerent, is a violation of neutrality: 3 Phillimore 321. These rules spring from
the inflexible duty of neutrals to observe strict impartiality. There
must be no fraudulent act against belligerent rights-no attempt
to depart from rigid neutrality. An intermixture or combination
of neutral and hostile operations by the same person, taints the
whole transaction: 3 Wh. 236, 2 Wh. 241. The loading of a
contraband cargo in a neutral port, or the preparation of a vessel
to run a blockade, though violative of international law, will not
enable a belligerent to enter, lawfully, into such a port and capture the contraband cargo or vessel; for such an act would be a
violation of neutral territory: 7 Wh. 283. Besides, a brepch of
blockade requires some movement towards the blockaded port. It
may be far away from the neutral country; yet the sailing of the
vessel with intent to enter that far-off port, is always considered
an overt act. The belligerent cannot trespass upon neutral sovereignty, by entering the neutral port itself, or making a capture
within the marine league; for belligerent jurisdiction does not
attach until the vessel is on the high seas, or within the municipal
control of the belligerent captor. When, however, a government
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in the exercise of its municipal sovereignty passes a law of nonintercourse, there can be no question of neutral rights raised
within its territorial .jurisdiction; that is, its municipal laws are
supreme within its own territory. Congress has passed penal laws
against fitting out vessels in American ports for the slave trade,
and it has, also, for the preservation of peace, and as an act of
good faith-towards other nations, forbidden the fitting out"of hostile expeditions, and the enlistment of soldiers, to act against
other powers with which the United States are in amity. Any act
done within this country in violation of those statutes, by foreign
subjects or our own citizens, is a direct breach of our municipal
laws, subjecting the offender to the prescribed penalties. The Act
of July 13th 1861; is a municipal and revenue statute.
Waiving all discussion of the constitutional question (which is
purely municipal or intra-territorial), and looking only to the international laws of blockade, neutrals cannot sail on a voyage,
with the intent to enter a blockaded port, without becoming lawful
prize under the law of nations. A citizen of the United States,
subject to the municipal law, may be forbidden by that law to do
what a neutral would have a right to do on the high seas. A neun
tral, for instance, may lawfully enter any unblockaded port of the
adverse belligerent, with a cargo not contraband, and depart therefrom; but if an American citizen (the United States being the
other belligerent), should attempt to do so, the United States might
subject him to severe penalties personally and confiscate his vessel
and cargo, if thus found - adherent to the enemy," as was done
by the Act of July 6th 1812. He is subject both to the law of
nations and to the municipal law of his own domicil. It is competent for the United States, as has been judicially determined, to
adopt embargo or non-intercourse acts with reference to foreign
nations, and the existence of a similar power with respect to any
part of this country in rebellion, has also been judicially maintained by several United States Courts, since the present civil war
commenced.
If, then, a sale of contraband property, in a neutral country,
to a belligerent, is a violation of neutrality under the law of na
tions (which law attempts to reconcile the rights of neutrals with
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the rights of belligerents), how under a municipal statute, which
forbids all commercial intercourse, should a clearance of a vessel
for an interdicted port, with or without contraband cargo, be conaidered ? The allegiance of the citizen is due to his country, and
he is bound by its laws. He is forbidden to trade with an insurrectionary district; "all commercial intercourse by and between
the same and the citizens thereof and the citizens of the rest of
the United States, shall cease and be unlawful ;" "cand all goods
and chattels, wares and merchandise, coming from said state or
section into the other parts of the United States, and all proceeding to such state or section by land or water, shall, together with
the vessel or vehicle, &c., be forfeited to the United States." The
overt act is not confined to actual entrance into the interdicted district-the success of the fraudulent voyage. If the offence was
not complete until success crowned the enterprise, the object of
the law would be defeated. The design of the statute is to prevent supplies from reaching the foe. Any movement towards aiding him-any act in furtherance of such a purpose, whether on
land or water, is within the spirit of the statute. "Proceeding
to" is a comprehensive phrase. If the prohibited intercourse is
attempted on land, and a person loads a wagon and starts in furtherance of his illegal design, is he not proeeeding in his fraudulent scheme-" proceeding to" violate his duty to the government?
At what point on the journey will the offence become complete, if
not at the first start ? Is the rule different if the contemplated
intercourse is through the agency of a vessel-to be by transportation
on water instead of land? The goods are within the territorial
jurisdiction of the United States, and owned by a United States
citizen, and consequently are subject to the intra-territorial law.
Every act done intra-territorially is subject to that law. If a sale
of contraband property to a belligerent, in a neutral territory, is
a violation of neutrality, d fortiori, such a sale in one belligerent
country by any citizen or domiciled person thereof, is a breach of
allegiance. This is not left to mere deduction from general principles. The Act of August 6th 1861, provides that all property,
of whatsoever kind, purchased or acquired, sold or given, with
intent to use the same or suffer the same to be used, in promoting

UNITED STATES vs- 129 PACKAGES.

the insurrection, shall be confiscated. The Act of May 20th 1862,
supplementary to the Act of July 13th 1861, after making provision for clearances in specified cases, and directing a. refusal of
clearances in others, whether the transportation is to be by land or
water, imposes the penalty of forfeiture for an attempt to transport goods, &c., in violation of that Act, or the Regulations of the
Secretary of the Treasury in pursuance thereof. The alleged
offence in this case was subsequent to that Act, and in violation of
its provisions and of the Regulations of the Secretary of the
Treasury. The claimant had so far " proceeded" in his fraudulent operations as to procure a permit and actually to ship his
goods. He had entered upon the interdicted enterprise. It was
an " attempt" by *vhich the penalty was incurred under the Act
of May 20th 1862, if not under the Act of July 13th 1861.
But there seems to be no difference in the true meaning of the
terms employed between an cattempt". to transport and "pro.
ceeding to" transport. The scope and object of the two acts are
the.same, viz. : to prevent the interdicted intercourse. If such,
however, is not the true construction of the Act of July 13th, the
goods in question would be held under the Act of May 20th, and
the necessary amendment of the libel allowed. The Act of July
13th, properly construed, forbids each and every act done towards
the execution of a design to carry on, without a licenge or permit,
commercial intercourse between the interdicted and other states.
It is violated not only when a vessel has actually sailed on the voyage with the goods on board, but the moment the goods are started,
even on land, towards the forbidden destination. - The application
for the "permit" is evidence of the intention to proceed, and the
exhibition of fraudulent invoices in order to procure the needed
permit, shows the intention to be fraudulent. The shipment of the
goods under color of that permit is a step taken in execution of
that fraudulent intent-is an overt act. Such goods, within the
meaning of said statute, are " proceeding to" the interdicted port;
and the shipper, under the Act of May 20th, is guilty of an "attempt" to transport them in violation of the law.
The Act of July 6th 1812 (2 U. S. St. 7T8), was entitled "An
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Act to prohibit American vessels from proceeding to, or trading
with, the enemies of the United States, and for other purposes."
It imposed forfeiture on every vessel that should depart from a
United States port for a foreign port; and fine and imprisonment
upon the master guilty of violating the act. Like penalties were
provided against "can attempt to transport" by land. The decisions with reference to that and other statutes for non-intercourse
and embargoes, indicate that the phrase -,proceeding to" has received the construction given above. A departure, under one of
its sections, and an attempt to transport, under another section,
were respectively overt acts of ",proceeding to" the interdicted
port or district. The William and Grace, Marriott's Decisions 76;
T]he -ebecca, Id. 197 ; The Julia,1 Gall. 43 ; Th e Friendship,Id.
45, 55; 7 Cranch 356 ; 9 Id. 102; 7 Id. 100 ; 2 Wheaton 148.
The next two points as presented depend for solution upon the
same principles.
By the language of -said Act of July 13th, tle prohibition is to
.e in force only ,so long as such condition of hostility shall continue," and the President's Proclamation of August 16th 1861,
excepts from the interdict such of the states therein named (including Tennessee), and such parts of said states " as may maintain a loyal adhesion to the Union and the Constitution, or may
be from time to time occupied and controlled by forces of the
United States engaged in the dispersion of said insurgents." The
claimant's proctor contends that ,the condition of hostility," &c.,
is a matter in pais, upon which the Court is to hear the testimony
of witnesses. He offers to prove by such witnesses that no such
condition existed at Memphis when his shipment was made; also,
the loyalty of that city, and that it was then occupied and controlled by United States forces. Indeed, for the purposes of
this trial, the District Attorney admits, as a matter in pais, that
Memphis was so occupied and controlled at the time, and tlfat hostilities were not flagrante bello, actually raging in that city at the
time; submitting to the Court, however, the question as to the
competency of-such modes of proof.
The doctrine involved has been fully discussed in several cases
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decided by this Court during the last fifteen months, and was virtually settled long ago by the United States Supreme Court. The
judiciary, under the constitution, cannot declare war or make
peace. It is clothed with no such power, and cannot be clothed
with it. Whatever power is vested by the constitution in one department of the government cannot be usurped by another. If
one should wholly refuse to act, or should undertake to divest
itself of; or abdicate, its legitimate functions, it would by no means
follow that another department, expressly limited to specified
duties, would thereby acquire ungranted powers. The abdication
of executive functions by the executive, for instance, would not
constitute the judicial the executive department, of the country;
nor would a failure or refusal of the legislative to pass needed
statutes constitute tle executive the law-making power. Each
department has its true boundaries prescribed by the constitution,
and it cannot travel beyond them. United States vs. Ferrera,18
How. 40; Little vs. Bareme, 2 Cranch 170.
The condition of peace or war, public or civil, in a legal sense,
must be determined by !he political department, not the judicial.
The latter is bound by the decision thus made. The Act of 1795
and the Act of July 18th 1861, vest the President with the
power to determine when insurrection exists, and to what extent
it exists.
The United States Constitution vests Congress with the power
cc to provide for calling forth the militia to execute the laws of the
Union, suppress insurrection, and repel invasion ;" "to declare
war, * * * and make rules concerning captures on land and water." In the execution of that power, Congress pa~sed the acts
cited above.
By the Act of 1795, the Supreme Court says, "the power of
deciding whether the exigency had arisen upon which the government of the United States is bound to interfere, is given to the
President. * * After the President has acted and called out the
militia, is a Circuit Court of the United States authorized to inquire whether his decision was right? Could the Court, while the
parties were actually contending in arms for the possession of the
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government, call witnesses before it and inquire which party represented a majority of the people ? * * If the judicial power extends
so far, the guarantee contained in the Constitution of the United
States is a guarantee of anarchy and not of order. Yet if this
right does not reside in the courts when the conflict is raging; if
the judicial power is at that time bound to follow the decision of
the political, it must be equally bound when -the contest is over. * *
At all events it (the power to decide) is conferred upon him (the
President) by the Constitution and laws of the United States, and
must therefore be respected and enforced in its judicial tribunals."
7 How. 43-4; also, see Martin vs. Mott, 12 Wheat. 29-31.
The same doctrine has been uniformly maintained from the
commencement of the government. The absurdity of any other
rule is manifest. If during the actual clash of arms, Courts were
rightfully hearing evidence as to the fact of war, and either with
or without the aid of juries, determining the question, they should
have power to enforce their decisions. In case of foreign conflicts
neither belligerent would be likely to yield to the decision: and
in case of insurrection, the insurgents already in arms against the
Constitution and laws, would not cease their rebellion in obedience
to a judicial decree. In short, the status of the country as to
peace or war, is legally determined by the political and not the
judicial department. When the decision is made the Courts are
concluded thereby, and bound to apply the legal rules which belong
to that condition. The same power which determines the existence
of war or insurrection, must also decide when hostilities have
ceased,-that is, when peace is restored. In a legal sense, the
state of war or peace is not a question inpais for Courts to determine. It is a legal fact ascertainable only from the decision of
the political department. 3 Wh. 246, 610; 4 Wh. 52, 497 ; 7 Wh.
283; 12 Wh. 19; 4 Cr. 24.1; 2 Pet. 253; 12 Pet. 511; 13 Pet.
815; 7 How. 1 ; 14 How. 46, 283.
Under the Act of July 13th, the President, on the 16th of
August 1861, proclaimed Tennessee in a state of insurrection. The
legal status thus determined must remain so long as the condition
of hostility continues. He has never made a counter proclamation,
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nor has peace been officially announced. As a legal condition that
status is independent of actual daily strife in arms. A legal conditibn of hostilities may exist between this and a foreign nation,
long after the last battle has teen fought between the opposing
armies. That condition ceases when peace is concluded through
competent authority : not before. The distinction is between war
flaqrante, and nondum ces8ante. So far, however, is it from being
true that the condition of hostilities does not still exist, that it is
evident, even as a matter in pais, that Tennessee is still in an
insurrectionary position. The presence of the United States armies
in Memphis and elsewhere within that state, for the purpose of
maintaining Federal authority against armed insurgents, is a wellknown necessity. There has been as yet no return of that State
to a peaceful status under the Constitution and laws: enabling
the civil tribunals, by-ordinary process, to enforce United States
authority. Within any construction which could be fairly given
to the President's Proclamation, no cpart of that state maintains
as yet a loyal adhesion to the Union and Constitution." It is the
duty of the President, however, to decide that point. -Until he
decides to the contrary, the Court must hold that the legal condition
of hostility continues.
The exceptions in the Proclamation, so far as made by the
President, Courts can and must enforce. But, if it be. correct that
by the terms of that proclamation the President intended to devolve
on the Courts the duty of determining judicially the status of a
state, or part of a state, by an inquiry into its loyalty, or its
occupation from time to time by United States forces, irrespective
of a decision thereon by the executive: still Courts ccufd not thus
acquire the power. The limits upon their constitutional and legal
functions could not thus be enlarged. Political power could not be
so delegated to them. They cannot be charged with any duties
not judicial: "judicial power" alone is vested in them under the
Constitution ; and the cases to which it extends are clearly defined :
United States vs. Ferreira,13 How. 40. They cannot go beyond
that well-defined limit. But the Act of July 13th gives the conditions on which the Proclamation issues, and declares its effect.
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It must pronounce what states or part of a state are in insurrec.
tion ; for it is the official promulgation of the fact as found by the
President. The exception quoted above does not change the rule.
At the date of that document (August 16th 1861), Tennessee was
proclaimed to be in insurrection, except as to such parts thereof
wheie a certain condition of affairs existed, or might from time to
time exist. How can any pairt of that state be brought within
the exception for judicial cognisance? Only by the action of
competent authority. The status of the part can be determined
by the President alone. Has he officially decided the status by
force of which the exception would operate, or Courts can judicially
,.scertain Memphis to be no longer in hostile condition ? Or, was
not that language used solely with a view to the proviso in the 5th
section of the Act ? It can hardly be supposed that he contemplated opening to unrestricted intercourse every town or district
of an insurrectionary state, which the United States armies might
occupy from time to time, on their march, irrespective of further
action ; thus leaving a town open to trade to-day and closed to-morrow, according to the shifting exigencies or convenience of military
operations and without any Treasury regulations therefor.
It is evident, however, that the language used in that exception
was not designed to leave so important a question open to doubt,
uncertainty, or the contingencies of military movements from day
to day. It was employed, perhaps, out of -abundant caution, so
as to announce that, from time to time, exceptions would' be put
into practical effect by him according to the rules stated: or to
bring such parts of those states within the terms of the proviso,
so that the Secretary of the Treasury might make the needed regulations therefor. A practical exemplification thereof is fbund in
the case of South Caroling and Louisiana. Those states were
included in the proclamation of August 16th 1861, and also in the
previous proclamation of blockade; yet by another proclamation
dated May 12th 1862, the President declares, that, by virtue of
the powers vested in him by said Act of July 13, the blockade of
the ports of Beaufort, Port Royal, and New Orleans, should cease
after the *first day of June following, except as to contraband
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" persons, things, and information," and commercial intercourse be
thereafter restored subject to the Treasury regulations made for
the purpose. Those ports had been for some time " occupied and
controlled by United States forces." Again, under the Act of
June 7th 1862, the President once more (July 1st 1862) proclaimed Tennessee and the other States named therein, to be "in
insurrection and rebellion," and there was no such exception as
that quoted from the prior proclamation of August 16th 1861
True, the proclamation of July 1st 1862 had reference to the Act
of June preceding; but it serves to indicate the status of Tennessee
as then officially recognised.
Under the proviso of the 5th- section of the Act of July 13th
1861, and by virtue of the Act of May 20th 1862, the Secretary
of the Treasury has made regulations, by compliance with which
persons may trade with Memphis. The claimant sought a cc permit"
as required, so that he might have the benefit of the exception.
He succeeded by fraud in procuring the desired paper, and then
undertook, in further fraud of the law, to take contraband or prohibited articles to that port.
Tennessee is interdicted to commercial intercourse, except on
the specified conditions, and by special permit. The claimant must
bring himself within the exceptions. 2 Cranch 72; 1 Gall. 104.
He not only has failed to do so; but on the contrary admits that
he exhibited fraudulent invoices to the surveyor of the port, and
violated the conditions on which alone a permit could be procured.
The statute pronounces the penalty of forfeiture against his whole
shipment.
The packages in. question are therefore declared forfeited, and
costs and expenses awarded against the claimant. ,
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The rule that there is no implied contract for compensation between parent and
child, on the one part for maintenance and educatioh and on the other for services, applies also between a child and a person assuming the relation of parent
to it.
Though the father is bound to maintain his child, yet if the latter is taken and
maintained by a relative without the father's previous request, though with his
assent, there is no implied contract by the father to reimburse the relative for
his expenses on the child's account.
A., on the death of his daughter, took her children home and maintained them,
though their father was living. The father married again and died, when A.
brought suit against his administrators for the maintenance: held, that under
the relations of the parties, there was no implied agreement by the father to
pay, and A. was not entitled to recover.

Error to the Common

ileas of Tioga county.

March 16th, 1863.-Opinion of the Court by
READ, J.-Judge LEWIS, in Seibert's Appeal, 7 Harris 56, says:
"It was well urged in the argument by .Mansfeld and lionblanque
for the plaintiff in Perry vs. T7titehead, that the ground that the

grandfather is not bound to provide for his grandchildren as a
father is for a child, and the former is therefore not under the same

moral obligation, would sound extraordinary out of a court of
judicature, and certainly affords no reason. The statute of Elizabeth imposes the same moral obligation upon a grandfather and
grandmother as upon the parents, which is the sense of the legislature and of mankind." 6 Yes. Jr. 546. "cIn Pennsylvania the

grandfather as well as the father is required by the Act of 13th
June 1836, § 28, to relieve and maintain his grandchildren when

their necessities require it.

This statute is in accordance with the

moral sense of mankind. Those who suppose that infant children
do not, upon the death of their parents, take the place of the
latter in the affections of their grandfather, are strangers to the

most ordinary manifestations of the best feelings of the human
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heart. As the mementoes of the departed they have peculiar
claims to his regard, and their -unprotected helplessness, produced
by the common bereavement, in most cases rivets his affection to
them closer than they ever clung to their parent."
No truer words were ever uttered by the learned judge, and no
commentary or paraphrase can add to the strength and beauty of
his language. The legal obligations are well pointed out by Judge PARSONS, in a very learned opinion, in the Guardians of the Poor
vs. Smith, 6 Penna. Law Journal 433.
A class of cases has been cited by the counsel for the plaintiffs
in error, in which claims for compensation for services rendered
have been rejected on account of the relations which the parties
bore to each other. Such was the case of Swire8 vs. Parsons, 5
W. &. S. 357, where a woman who had lived, with a man as his
wife sought to recover from his estate compensation for services
performed in his lifetime. There the Court held that the relation
between the parties repelled the idea of a contract' So in Qandor's
Apeal, Id. 513, it was held that a child is not entitled to recover
wages for services rendered from the estate of the deceased parent,unless upon clear and unequivocal proof, leaving no doubt that
the relation between the parties was not the ordinary one of parent
and child, but of master and servant. The same doctrine was
enunciated in TJefrance vs. Austin, 9 Barr 309, where the claim
was by an infant nephew against his uncle, and in Lantz vs. Frey
and WMfe, 2 Harris 201, where a stepdaughter claimed compensation for services rendered to her stepfather whilst living with him
during her minority. So in Lynn vs. Lynn, 5 Casey 869, where
a son brought a charge of boarding his mother againit her estate.
The converse of the proposition was ruled in Cummings vs.
Cammings, 8 Watts 366, where the claim was by the mother
against her daughter for maintenance while an infant, the Court
said the presumption from a mother's maintenance of a child,
whatever be the means of either, is that she furnished it as a gift.
In Pelly vs. Rawlins, Peake's Addit. Cases 226, it was held if a
husband educate a wife's child by a former husband, he cannot
recover compensation from such child when it comes of age. This
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case is cited in Chitty, Jr., on Contracts, by Russell, 6th ed., pp.
48, 144, and he says in such cases no recovery can be had unless
there be an express promise to repay him, which is also stated as
the .law in 1 Story on Contracts, § 82 f.
In Williams vs. Hutchinson, 5 Barbour 122, which was affirmed
by the Court of Appeals in 3 Comstock 312, it was held that a
stepfather is not entitled by law to the custody or services of the
children of his wife by a former husband, nor is he bound to
maintain them, but if he assumes the relation of a parent to such
child, receives him into his family, supports and educates him, and
there is no express agreement to pay wages to the stepchild, he
cannot maintain an action against the stepfather for services rendered while a minor, although the value of the services may exceed
the expenses of such education and support, and a promise to pay
wages will not be implied. The whole reasoning of the Court
proceeds upon a principle which would likewise exclude the stepfather from claiming any compensation for his expenditures for
the stepchild. And this doctrine was expressly declared in Sharp
vs. Grosby, 11 Barbour 224. This assumed relation of father
entitles him on the one hand to the services of his stepchildren,
and entitles them on the other hand to their support and education
without remuneration. In Chilcott vs. Kemble et al., Ex'rs., 13
Barbour 502, where a parent was willing to support his infant.
child, and a relative, without his request but with his assent,
received the child into her family and supported it as a child of
her own, it was held that no agreement of the father to pay foi
such support could be implied, and that the moral obl:gation of .
parent to support his child imposes on him no liability to pay fol
its support furnished by a relative without his requestThat case was similar in its circumstances to the case now under
consideration. The mother died, when the child, who was four
months old, was taken by her grandparents. The father rIarrie-]
a second time, and the child went back to him, butt returned in -A
short time to her grandparents, with whom she livcd until their
death, and continued to reside with her uncle, Tho had been iA
the same house with his parents, and he furnished her with cloth-
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ing and schooling, and she performed such services as are usually
performed by girls of her age, such as housework, spinning, &c.
There was evidence of declarations of the father, the testator,
after the marriage of the daughter, that he was going to pay the
uncle for keeping his child. The court, however, ruled as we
have already stated, and also that as the evidence relied upon to
prove an express promise referred to a time after the service was
performed, the consideration was past and executed, and not sufficient to maintain an assumpsit unless moved by a precedent request.
There is also a very strong case of .Eilet vs. Waller, 2 Bradford
287, where it was held that there was no legal obligation on the
intestate to compensate the uncle for the support of the child
during the period she resided with him, he having made no demand
on the father to assume the care of his daughter or to pay for her
support.
In the present case, Mrs. Harrison, a daughtek of the plaintiff,
died on the 8th of June 1851, leaving eight children. Three of
thein, all girls, one six weeks old, another two years old, and ihe
other four years old, were taken from the funeral of the mother
by their grandparents, the plaintiff and his wife, to their house.
Mr. Harrison married again, and died in 1855. Some time after
the death of the intestate, the plaintiff presented to .his administrators a claim of $690, for the boarding and clothing of these
children.
There was no evidence of any previous request on the part of
the father, nor any contract by him with the plaintiff, nor of any
express promise on his part to pay, and only some 'declarations
which, under the decisions, were of no weight or consequence.
As the relation of the plaintiff and the children precluded the idea
that there could be any implied agreement on the part of the
father to pay, it was clearly error on the part of the Court to
charge the jury that in the absence of an agreement with the father
not to charge, the plaintiff was entitled to recover a reasonable
compensation, the amount of which will be determined by the jury.
The very reverse of this would have been sounder -law.
Judgment reversed, and venire de novo awarded.

